Summarize this content to 2000 words in 6 paragraphs in Arabic Unlock the Editor\u2019s Digest for freeRoula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.The writer is a global economist and author of \u2018The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism\u2019Technological leaps are rarely born in comfort. They are forged in conflict, competition and necessity. From nuclear energy to the space race, and now the unfolding artificial intelligence rivalry between the US and China \u2014 innovation accelerates when the stakes are highest. US President Donald Trump\u2019s catastrophic tariff war may inflict serious economic pain on China, but it could also ignite a technological surge \u2014 not by design, but by necessity.Although China\u2019s most urgent economic challenge remains internal, 125 per cent US tariffs give Beijing a clear pretext to act \u2014 to stimulate aggressively, subsidise strategically, sharpen its survival instinct and double down on technological supremacy.If Washington\u2019s aim is to suppress China\u2019s rise, it\u2019s going about it all wrong.Tariffs don\u2019t just alter trade flows \u2014 they redirect resources and reshape industrial structures. If Trump\u2019s goal was to curb China\u2019s technological progress, he would keep tariffs low on the bulk of Chinese exports to the US, locking the country into low-margin basic manufacturing. He would encourage high-tech exports to China, making sure that progress in its advanced components stalls.But this is the opposite of what\u2019s happening. Ironically, just as the \u201cChina shock\u201d pushed the US out of low-end manufacturing, the \u201cTrump shock\u201d is propelling China to reallocate resources into higher value, advanced technologies that compete directly with the US.Beijing has drawn its conclusion: innovation and core technology control is the only sustainable defence against tariffs. Companies with proprietary technology \u2014 like Huawei and BYD \u2014 are more insulated from tariffs and supply-chain shocks. China envisions a new tech supply-chain model: regional production, tech sovereignty and global supply-chain redundancy.Never have technology and innovation been as central to China\u2019s national agenda as they are today. The \u201cAI+\u201d strategy aims to rapidly embed AI in all sectors possible. Low-cost AI model creator DeepSeek was born under constraint. It is now being deployed around the world.In 2019, a Rmb200bn \u201cbottleneck technologies\u201d fund was established to ensure 70 per cent domestic substitution in critical areas within three years. China is investing heavily in photonic quantum computing, building low-orbit satellite networks to rival Elon Musk\u2019s Starlink and laying the foundation for commercial space stations. It is targeting breakthroughs in chipmaking equipment and leads the world in factory robot density. \u00a0If China had been drifting towards elevated state-led agendas, the tariff shock is pulling it back to economic fundamentals. The trade war is functioning as a reset, reaffirming the primacy of growth and competition. Support for the private sector is showing signs of revival. Tax relief and business-friendly policies are returning. Technological restrictions often have unintended consequences. Rather than stalling progress, they redirect demand inward. Take semiconductors: China consumes a third of global chips and once relied heavily on US suppliers. Sanctions didn\u2019t reduce that demand \u2014 they rerouted it. Now, domestic companies such as SMIC are reporting record revenues and reinvesting in R&D. As the Chinese saying goes, good companies don\u2019t \u201clie flat\u201d \u2014 they adapt. The first wave of Trump\u2019s sanctions sparked a globalisation frenzy. Chinese companies moved quickly to relocate production, expand into new markets and alter their business models. Shenzhen-listed Transsion now holds 51 per cent of Africa\u2019s smartphone market. Smartphone maker Xiaomi derives 75 per cent of its revenue from overseas.Rising tariffs also accelerate the shift towards digital supply chains, service trade and cloud infrastructure \u2014 trends that play to China\u2019s strengths in digital platforms, AI and ecommerce. Though still a manufacturing powerhouse, China accounts for less than 6 per cent of global service trade, leaving vast room to grow as that\u00a0explodes relative to goods. \u00a0History has seen this dynamic before. When Napoleon tried to cripple British trade through the Continental System, Britain pivoted towards Asia, Africa and the Americas, towards industrialisation and mechanisation. Rising costs and pressure on wages were the catalysts for the steam engine, textile mills and naval power. \u00a0\u00a0The US may be repeating that mistake. If making America great again is its goal, Trump should not fear a comfortable China; he should fear a constrained one.\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Summarize this content to 2000 words in 6 paragraphs in Arabic Unlock the Editor\u2019s Digest for freeRoula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.The writer is a global economist and author of \u2018The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism\u2019Technological leaps are rarely born in comfort. They are forged<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[63],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-271035","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","6":"category-tech"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/271035","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=271035"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/271035\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=271035"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=271035"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=271035"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}