Summarize this content to 2000 words in 6 paragraphs in Arabic For the past four years, Alan Estevez has been finding new obstacles to place in China\u2019s path as it tries to use US technology to develop cutting-edge chips and artificial intelligence.\u201cWe\u2019re running down the alley throwing garbage cans,\u201d Estevez told the Financial Times on his penultimate day as under-secretary of commerce for industry and security in Joe Biden\u2019s administration.Estevez and Tarun Chhabra, a White House official, have been responsible for policies designed to slow China\u2019s semiconductor and AI industries by severing access to critical US technology.In their final week, the commerce department unveiled several significant rules, including a global licensing regime for AI data centre chips that garnered resistance from industry and criticism from the European Commission.Estevez conceded that US policy could do no more than slow China since it had smart engineers, money to invest and government support. But he said Washington had been successful, pointing to statements from Chinese AI groups identifying US export controls as their main obstacle.\u201cWe\u2019ve definitely impeded the People\u2019s Republic of China\u2019s ability to produce those chips and ergo have impacted their ability to develop large language models,\u201d said Estevez, referring to the models that power AI products.The outgoing under-secretary has straddled two forces: American companies and some allies who believe the US went too far, and critics who wanted the administration to take even harsher, quicker, action against China and its military.He pushed back against criticism of the recent AI rule, which puts countries into three tiers in terms of ease of access to US chips. Estevez said it appeared to spark more criticism because the companies complaining, such as Nvidia, were household names, unlike the chipmaking equipment producers that opposed other export controls.Over the past four years, Estevez and Chhabra have held long and often contentious talks with allies, particularly Japan and the Netherlands, to build a seamless export control regime for chipmaking tools.Tokyo and The Hague eventually agreed to many actions pushed by Washington \u2014 in some cases after threats of extraterritorial action \u2014 but the talks highlighted a problem for the US and allies: Chinese retaliation. Beijing threatened to restrict exports of two critical minerals, gallium and germanium, to Japan if it went along with Washington.\u201cWe do need to think harder about how we are going to wean ourselves off adversarial supply chains,\u201d said Estevez, explaining the need to reduce Beijing\u2019s ability to create choke points that make it harder for the US and allies to take actions against China.\u201cWhat I wish we had done sooner\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009is sharing our intelligence [with allies] and where we see threats,\u201d he said. \u201cWhen we do that, they actually say: \u2018Yeah, you\u2019re right\u2019, and that makes it easier to dialogue.\u201dEstevez noted some companies struggled to understand the national security implications of selling technology to China, particularly because they had focused on that market for decades before Washington became more hawkish on Beijing.\u201cFor American business, it was like \u2018gung ho\u2019 until suddenly it\u2019s not. I don\u2019t think everyone has got that in their strategic mindset of where those lines are,\u201d said Estevez, adding that the US government needed to do a better job explaining the risks to companies who did not have security clearances.While the administration has been criticised by industry, others have questioned why the government did not take quicker action against efforts by Chinese telecoms equipment maker Huawei to move into the chip sector.Estevez said the US was \u201creally successful\u201d in using controls to target equipment going to fabrication plants linked to Huawei.But he said the US could not take immediate action when it discovered in 2023 that Huawei was building chip fabrication plants, partly because unilateral moves would not have been effective and also because it needed more intelligence to explain the threat to allies to seek their co-operation.As Estevez leaves office, he stressed that the Bureau of Industry and Security, which he runs, needed more resources to deal with the expanding threat. It also needs more modern technology, including AI, to boost efficiency in order to, for example, stay on top of Chinese companies that change their name to avoid scrutiny from the US.\u201cI wish I could have made the inter-agency process a little more agile and a little more strategic,\u201d he said, noting that he and Chhabra would normally \u201ccut a deal\u201d but then had to grapple with the whole government.Estevez said his biggest concern as he prepared to hand over the reins to Donald Trump\u2019s team was China\u2019s technology sector, particularly AI, which he described as the \u201cfuture of warfare\u201d.\u201cIt\u2019s going to be the good side of that future, too,\u201d he said, \u201cand we\u2019re just going to impede the bad side of that future.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Summarize this content to 2000 words in 6 paragraphs in Arabic For the past four years, Alan Estevez has been finding new obstacles to place in China\u2019s path as it tries to use US technology to develop cutting-edge chips and artificial intelligence.\u201cWe\u2019re running down the alley throwing garbage cans,\u201d Estevez told the Financial Times on<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[63],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-172746","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","6":"category-tech"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/172746","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=172746"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/172746\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=172746"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=172746"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/globetimeline.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=172746"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}