The study, published in PLOS Biology, explores how the unobservable nature of effort and risk impacts the research strategies of investigators and the incentive structures within which they work. Using a mathematical framework based on hidden-action models from economic theory, researchers Kevin Gross and Carl Bergstrom consider the challenges faced by the scientific community in rewarding discoveries in a way that encourages effort and risk-taking while also protecting researchers’ livelihoods. The model reveals that incentives to motivate effort clash with incentives to motivate risk-taking, leading to a tendency for researchers to work on safe projects that may hinder scientific progress.
Scientific research involves taking risks, as cautious approaches are unlikely to lead to rapid progress. However, much funded research tends to play it safe, with funding agencies struggling to attract high-risk, high-return projects. The model developed by Gross and Bergstrom highlights the difficulties in motivating researchers to take scientific risks, as failed projects could be attributed to risky undertakings or simple laziness. This dilemma results in incentives that encourage effort but discourage risk-taking, ultimately leading to a more conservative approach to science.
Researchers respond to these conflicting incentives by choosing safer projects that demonstrate effort but may not advance scientific knowledge as quickly as riskier endeavors. The study suggests that a social planner who values scientific productivity over researchers’ well-being could potentially remedy this issue by offering substantial rewards for major discoveries, thereby incentivizing high-risk research. However, this approach would also expose scientists to greater livelihood risks, making them worse off in the long run. The self-governing nature of the scientific community further complicates the establishment of reward structures that effectively balance effort and risk-taking.
The authors emphasize that the tendency towards safer projects in scientific research is not a result of institutional or personal failings, but rather a natural response to the inherent trade-off between effort and risk. They argue that scientists who prioritize the security of their careers will inevitably opt for safer projects, even if scientific funders prefer higher-risk endeavors. This dynamic ultimately leads to a tradition of conservative science that may not be optimal for maximizing scientific progress, highlighting the complexities of incentivizing innovation within the research community.
In conclusion, the study sheds light on the challenges faced by the scientific community in balancing the need to motivate effort and risk-taking. The inherent conflict between these incentives often results in a more cautious approach to research, with scientists choosing safer projects to protect their careers. While commentators frequently criticize the lack of high-risk, high-return research in science, the study suggests that this phenomenon is a natural consequence of the complex interplay between effort, risk, and reward within the scientific enterprise. Moving forward, addressing these challenges will require a nuanced understanding of the incentives and motivators that drive scientific discovery.